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Recent years have seen a large amount of empirical studies related to “embodied cog-
nition.” While interesting and valuable, there is something dissatisfying with the current
state of affairs in this research domain. Hypotheses tend to be underspecified, testing
in general terms for embodied versus disembodied processing. The lack of specificity of
current hypotheses can easily lead to an erosion of the embodiment concept, and result
in a situation in which essentially any effect is taken as positive evidence. Such erosion is
not helpful to the field and does not do justice to the importance of embodiment. Here
we want to take stock, and formulate directions for how it can be studied in a more fruitful
fashion. As an example we will describe few example studies that have investigated the
role of sensori-motor systems in the coding of meaning (“embodied semantics”). Instead
of focusing on the dichotomy between embodied and disembodied theories, we suggest
that the field move forward and ask how and when sensori-motor systems and behavior
are involved in cognition.
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INTRODUCTION: EXCITING EMBODIMENT
In the last two decades, cognitive science has embraced the thesis
of “embodiment.” Embodied cognition stresses the intertwined
nature of thinking and acting, and as such is an antidote to the
traditional divide between cognition on the one hand and percep-
tion and action on the other. The excitement about embodiment
within cognitive science lies mainly in its promise to destroy the
traditional “sandwich” (or “hamburger”) model of cognitive pro-
cessing, with its strict perception-cognition-action scheme (e.g.,
Hurley, 2001). The sandwich model regards “thinking” as the real
stuff (the beef so to say), and takes perception and action as
separated slave systems, providing input to cognitive processors
(perception) and executing its commands (action).
Instead, embodied cognition stresses that perception and action
are directly relevant for our thinking, and that it is a mistake to
regard them as separate. The thesis comes in various formats, and
a more in depth coverage is beyond the scope of this article (e.g.,
O’Regan, 1992; Van Gelder, 1995; Clark, 1997; Barsalou, 1999;
Wilson, 2002; Noe, 2004; Gallagher, 2005; Wheeler, 2005).
In this paper we want to take stock and see what embodi-
ment has done for a particular research domain in cognitive sci-
ence, namely the study of semantic representations. With respect
to semantic representations, embodied cognition is related to
the claim of modality-specific versus abstract representations,
in which modality-specific views predict sensori-motor cortex
to be constitutive of conceptual representations (see Kiefer and
Pulvermüller, 2012 for an excellent recent overview).
This being an opinion paper, it is by no means our intention
to give an overview of the field. Instead we highlight certain stud-
ies, where we could have chosen others. Of particular importance
is that we have chosen to ignore the neuropsychological litera-
ture regarding semantic representations (see e.g., Gainotti, 2000;
Caramazza and Mahon, 2003; Kiefer and Pulvermüller, 2012).
THE EROSION OF A CONCEPT: THE CASE OF EMBODIED
SEMANTICS REPRESENTATIONS
Often embodied cognition is defined very broadly. When we for
example look at experiments investigating “embodied semantics,”
an important prediction is that understanding sensori-motor con-
cepts leads to activation of sensori-motor cortices. So when people
read about hand and foot actions, parts of the motor cortex
involved in moving the hands and the feet are activated (e.g.,
Hauk et al., 2004; Tettamanti et al., 2005). Although interesting
from the sandwich model perspective, it is unfortunate that the
main hypothesis often does not go beyond predicting “involve-
ment” of sensori-motor cortices (see also Binder and Desai, 2011;
see also Chatterjee, 2010).
An illustration of this lack of specificity is how easily embodied
cognition can capture strikingly different findings. For instance,
Buccino et al. (2005) used single-pulse TMS to stimulate the hand
or foot/leg motor area while participants were listening to sen-
tences expressing foot and hand actions. Reaction times (RTs) and
motor evoked potentials (MEPs) were specifically modulated for
the effector involved in the described action: a hand-action-related
sentence produced decreased MEPs in the hand area and slower
RTs when subjects responded with their hand. The authors con-
clude that the processing of language modulates the activity of the
motor system in an effector specific way. However, in another TMS
study with a similar design Pulvermuller et al. (2005a) report that
faster RTs are observed to hand/arm words after stimulation of the
hand area.
It is striking that although the results are opposite (slower versus
faster RTs),both are taken as confirmation of the embodied seman-
tics theory. Instead, the researchers could have elaborated more
about the reason of their divergent findings. For instance, maybe
the differences arise because the interference occurs at a decision
making level after semantic analysis (Mahon and Caramazza,2008;
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Chatterjee, 2010). By formulating more specific hypotheses, e.g.,
here on the direction of the effect and the underlying mechanism,
these findings could have been more informative. It strikes us as
disappointing to not go beyond the conclusion of involvement of
cortical motor areas; the pattern of results suggests that some-
thing more interesting is going on than motor cortex activation in
response to action words. One is left with the question what result
would be taken as evidence against embodied cognition?
Another sign of an underspecified theory is that similar findings
can be interpreted as evidence in favor as well as against embod-
iment. Take the studies of Saygin et al. (2010) and Bedny et al.
(2008).
First, Saygin et al. showed activation of perceptual (visual) areas
when subjects were reading sentences describing motion. More
specifically, they found increased BOLD levels in motion sensitive
area MT+ when participants read sentences like “The wild horse
crossed the barren field” versus “The black horse stood in the bar-
ren field” (Saygin et al., 2010). Second, in the study of Bedny et
al. participants judged pairs of words that implied motion (ani-
mals, e.g.,“the horse,”“the dog”),had intermediate implied motion
(tools, e.g., “the sword,” “the axe”), or had little implied motion
(natural kinds, e.g., “the bush,” “the pebble”). These authors did
not find modulation of MT+ activity for words with different
motion ratings. Regions within posterior lateral temporal cortex
were more active when comparing verbs and nouns, independent
of the amount of motion associations of the words.
A general theory of embodiment would have predicted both
studies to find modulation in area MT+ related to amount of
motion expressed in the materials. The fact that the one study
does observe such modulation, and the other does not is an inter-
esting clue to the context-dependence of sensory cortex activations
during language comprehension or as Saygin et al. (2010) p. 2486)
put it: “the choice of task and stimuli can influence the power to
detect modulations of MT+ by linguistic events.” Instead, what
happens is that one set of authors interpret their findings as in line
with embodied cognition, and the other set of authors interprets
their findings as evidence against embodiment, since they show
that retrieval of sensory motor features is not obligatory during
word comprehension (Bedny et al., 2008). The differences in their
findings can probably be attributed to the differences in design.
However, both studies generalize their results to the question of
whether it supports an embodied or disembodied account, and it
is in this interpretation stage that opposite conclusions are drawn.
Many experiments are driven by the “embodied versus disem-
bodied” distinction. This is not a fruitful approach, and in the
next section we will show that such a broad distinction does not
do justice to the experimental findings that are available. To fore-
shadow our conclusion: Instead of quarreling about embodied
versus disembodied, the field should take the next step and ask
the question when and how sensori-motor cortices play a role in
understanding.
TAKING STOCK: EMBODIED SEMANTICS
When we take a bird’s eye perspective toward experiments studying
sensori-motor cortex involvement when participants read or lis-
ten to language describing sensori-motor events (action and visual
language), a few things stand out:
– Sensori-motor cortices can be activated during language com-
prehension. For instance, cortical motor hand areas can be
activated when participants read verbs related to hand actions
(e.g., Hauk et al., 2004; Tettamanti et al., 2005).
– These sensori-motor activations can be fast (e.g., Pulvermuller
et al., 2005b).
– Changing the activation level (via training or with TMS) of the
motor system can influence processing of action-related lan-
guage, suggesting a functional role (e.g., Glenberg et al., 2008;
Willems et al., 2011).
– Some studies do not replicate sensori-motor activations when
participants listen to action-language (e.g., Postle et al., 2008).
– Sensori-motor involvement is dependent on task and linguistic
context (e.g., Sato et al., 2008; Papeo et al., 2009).
Of these findings, the latter one deserves more attention than
it has gotten so far: Sensori-motor cortex involvement during
understanding of action and perceptual language is task- and
context-dependent.
For instance, it has been shown that the motor system is differ-
ently modulated depending on the experimental task. In a study by
Sato et al. (2008) hand-action verbs interfered with button presses
when participants performed a semantic task, but this was not the
case when they performed a lexical decision task.
Similarly, in an elegant study Papeo et al. (2009) reported
modulation of hand MEPs during reading of hand-action verbs
when single-pulse TMS was applied, but again only during an
explicit semantic categorization task (on action-relatedness) but
not during a syllable detection task.
Another example of context-dependence is provided by Raposo
et al. (2009) who showed that activation in motor cortex var-
ied depending on the way verbs were presented: when verbs were
viewed in isolation (“kick”) or in literal sentences (“kick the ball”)
motor cortex was activated, but when the verbs were presented
in idiomatic contexts (“kick the bucket”), no motor or premotor
activation was present (see also Aziz-Zadeh et al., 2006; but see
Boulenger et al., 2009).
Van Dam et al. (2012) varied the linguistic context in a dif-
ferent way: they instructed participants to focus either on the
action or on the color aspect of a word’s referent. Activation in
action- and motion-related areas was higher in the former than
in the latter condition. The authors suggest that the “action” con-
text emphasized action properties of the object and that therefore
the corresponding action features were relevant in constituting the
concept.
CONCLUSION
So on the one hand, the state of affairs is favorable to embod-
ied semantics: there can be involvement of sensori-motor cor-
tices in understanding action and perceptual language. This is
an important insight and definitely constitutes a way forward in
our thinking about the neural basis of conceptual knowledge (see
Kiefer and Pulvermüller, 2012 for overview). But the involvement
of sensori-motor cortex in conceptual representations is of a more
complex nature than a simple binary “yes” or “no.” Investigating
“an involvement” of sensori-motor cortices in conceptual knowl-
edge was perhaps a good first step, but needs to be followed up by
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more specific hypotheses. Future research needs to be more specific
on when and how sensori-motor cortices are involved in language
understanding. One reason for this is that current findings are
too easily interpreted as confirming embodied accounts (see also
Chatterjee, 2010). A second motivation is the fact that several stud-
ies show the context-dependence of sensori-motor involvement in
language understanding. Computational models can be impor-
tant in making the operations that take place in sensori-motor
cortices more explicit, and the field should take more advantage
of those (e.g., Chersi et al., 2010). Only with such specificity can
embodied cognition make progress and will the concept retain its
value.
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